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Part-time work has recently received renewed atten tion in Spain as its Pri me Minister, José 
Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, has offered to use part -time (PT) work as a measure to increase labor 
market flexibility in the midst of the current ec onomic crisis.  However, little is known in S pain on 
whether  PT em ployment,  which is mainly female   employment,  offers the opport unity  for  career 
progression or the risk o f career stagnation in a countr y with a striking segmentation of its l abor 
market.  This paper uses a rich longitudinal Spanis h data set to investigate the PT / full-time (FT)  
wage  growth differential between p rime-aged  women  strongly  attached to the labor force, 
distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent  or fixed-term.  The empirical strategy adjusts for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity and addresses  differential measurement errors by PT status 
problems.    The  paper als o  exploits a legislative ch ange  to address  sample  selection  into ty pe  of 
contract.  We find evidence of a PT penalty in Spain and that this penalty is greater for workers with 
fixed-term contracts.  After accounting for workers’ observable and unobservable characteristics, we 
find that PT women with permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 log points lower hourly wage 
growth per year than their FT counterp arts, and that PT women with fixed-term contract experience 
3.9 log points lower hourly wage growth per y ear then their FT counterparts.  These  estimates are 
similar to the ones we would obtain if we were to control for employer characteristics.  The reason for 
this is that the greater los s caused by the occupational downgrading and emplo yer turnover of PT 
workers seems to be cancelled out by workers’  upgrading to better paid industries (or, alternatively , 
coming from relatively lower paid industries to start with).  Finally, we have found that while women 
with permanent contracts negatively self-select into PT employment, the opposite occurs for women 
with fixed-term contracts.  We believe that the positive self-selection into PT fixed-term jobs is due to 
the dual nature of the S panish labor market and th e marginalization of fixed-term contracts.  The  
paper concludes with some policy implications. 
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Part-time  work  has  recently  received  renewed  attention  in  Spain  as  its Pri me  Minister,  José Luí s 
Rodríguez Zapatero,  has in cluded  part-time (PT)  work as  one of  its six   key  new measures to  fight 
unemployment, which, at 16 %, is th e highest in the EU-27.  The underlying economic argument for 
using PT work is that an increase in PT work will add flexibility in a labor market with a high share of 
unemployment and stringent employment protection legislation (see, Jimeno Serrano and Ortega Massé, 
2003 for a thorough description of the Spanish labor market).  Supply and demand factors dovetail here, 
in that job shortages encourage workers who want full-time (FT) employment to accept PT jobs (Smith, 
Fagan and Rubery, 1998).  Even though PT work may appear an interesting tool for policy makers to 
increase labor market flexibility in the midst of the current economic crisis, the usefulness of PT work in 
achieving economic and individuals’ professional development is and has been a prominent and heated 
debate  among  academics,  policy  makers  and  practitioners  in  Europe  and  elsewhere  (Bardasi  and 
Gornick, 2000; Buddelmeyer et al., 2005).   
 
Within this literature, many researchers have increasingly become interested in analyzing the pay 
differential between PT female workers and their FT counterparts—see Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 
1990; Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Montgomery and Cosgrove, 1995; Jepsen, 2001; Wolf, 2002; Hu and 
Tijdens, 2003; Rodgers, 2004; Jepsen et al., 2005; Hardoy and Schøne, 2006; Manning and Petrongolo, 
2008; and Connolly and Gregory, 2008, among others.  Finding out whether there is  a PT penalty is 
important in the lig ht of the recent surge in PT employment in many industrialized countries, and the 
relative  concentration  of  women  in  PT job s  (making  the  issue  a  major  one  in g ender  equality).  
Unfortunately,  the P T/FT  wage  differential  estimates  are all o ver  the  board.    While  some  of  the 
differences  in  the  results are  explained  by  countries’  institutional  and  cultural  differences,  and  the 
amount of information available on workers, jobs, and labor market characteristics; several identification 
problems within this literature are difficult to overcome.  First, there is unobserved heterogeneity as PT 
and FT workers might differ in their tastes and expectations towards paid work.  Second, most studies 
rely on survey data, which may lead to important measurement errors in key variables—such as hours, 
wages and PT status (OECD, 2002; Pissarides et al., 2003; Naci Mocan and Erdal Tekin,2003; Buligescu 
et al., 2008).
1  Third, there is the danger of reverse causation here: maybe it is low wages that ‘cause’ PT 
work, not PT work that ‘causes’ low wages (Aaronson and French, 2004; and Manning and Petrongolo, 
2008, among others). 
 
In addition, one of the major shortcomings of the European literature is the small sample size of 
individuals who work PT.  This problem is particularly concerning when longitudinal data are available 
and  fixed-effects  ‘within’  estimators  are  used  to  address  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  problem  by 
identifying the PT effect on wages through those workers who switch status.  For instance, Connolly and 
Gregory (2008) report that in any year, fewer than 9% of those in FT work switch to PT work in the UK.  
For Spain, Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) find that in any y ear, 1.52% (1.79%) of those women in FT (PT) 
work  switch to PT  (FT) work.   Perhaps,  this explains why there  has been so  little  attention  in th e 
literature on the differential effect of PT on wages for different population subgroups, such as ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ in a segmented labor market.
2  Clearly the underlying forces behind PT work may differ 
drastically  in  the prim ary  labor  market,  which  consists  of  well  paid  and  secure  jobs  with  high-
productivity growth, than in the secondary labor market, where jobs are poorly paid and of a precarious 
                                                 
1 There are some exceptions.  For instance, Connolly and Gregory (2008) use an administrative employers’ panel 
dataset, and  Naci Mocan and Erdal Tekin (2003) use an employer-employee matched dataset. 
2 To our knowledge, Naci Mocan and Erdal Tekin (2003) analyze the nonprofit sector dimension, Mumford and 
Smith (2008) analyze the gender dimension, and O’Connel and Gash (2003), Hughes and Nolan (1997) and Tilly 




nature.  For instance, Tilly (1996) highlighted the coexistence in the US labor market of ‘retention’ PT 
jobs, which were used in the primary sector to retain valued and skilled employees, and PT jobs in the 
secondary market, which ended up being low pay and low security jobs.  
 
The central point of this article is to examine the PT / FT wage g rowth differential between 
workers with permanent contracts and those with fixed-term contracts.  Our focus is o n adult women 
between 24 and 45 years old and strongly attached to the labor force.  We co ntrol for workers’ socio-
demographic  characteristics  (including  presence  and  age o f  children  in  the hou sehold),  employer’s 
characteristics, and workers’ previous employment history.  We acc ount for worker heterogeneity by 
exploiting a rich longitudinal dataset obtained from the Social Security records that covers employment 
history from 1985 to 2006, and has only recently been available to researchers in Spain.
3  As our data 
comes for Social Security records, we use contractual monthly wages and hours to calculate the hourly 
wages.    Despite  the  superiority  of  our  data (co mpared  to  worker  survey  data),  we believe that  
measurement error in contractual hours may still raise some concern if PT workers consistently work a 
greater number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to their FT counterparts.  To address this 
problem, we focus our attention on the wage change as opposed to wage level, and drop from our sample 
of analysis the observations of wage change observed exactly when status changes (this represents 
about 5% of our sample.  However, notice that for X% of our sample of switchers from FT to PT 
(or vice-versa) we observe them for subsequent years after their PT status switch).  Assuming that 
differential  measurement  error b y  PT status is  an  individual-employment-status  fixed  effect, o ur 
approach circumvents the problem.  We do not model selection into PT employment.  Therefore, we do 
not strictly identify the causal impact on wages of working PT.
4  However, considering that longitudinal 
estimates more closely approximate average treatment effects among the treated than among random 
draws from the population (Hirsch, 2005), we believe that our estimates address some of the issues raised 
in this literature and bring new evidence on the situation of PT workers in segmented labor markets in 
general, and in Spain, more specifically.  Finally, we try to address selection into type of contract by 
exploiting a legislative change that took place in Spain in the late-1990s, and that increased workers’ job 
protection for both types of workers—with the law  change, workers who wanted to reduce their work 
week could do so without the risk of being fired.  The law implied clear protection rules for all workers 
who exerted their rights of flexible (and reduced) working hours in 1999: it declared a layoff (or non-
renovation of contract) invalid if the worker had previously asked for work-week reduction due to family 
or other family dependent responsibilities.
5   
 
Spain is a  suitable case to investigate this issue because of the striking segmentation of the 
Spanish labor  market (see  for  instance,  Adam,  1996;  Guell  and  Petrongolo, 2007;  OTHERS).   The 
Spanish unemployment rate has been extremely high (as much as one fifth of the labor force) for almost 
two decades (during the 1980s and 1990s), and it is c urrently the highest in Europe.  In add ition, an 
important dual labor market developed after the 1984 legislation changes, resulting in the economy with 
                                                 
3 Although several papers have used longitudinal data to estimate the PT pay penalty (Blank, 1998; Hirsch, 2005; 
Booth and Wood, 2005; OTHERS?), very few have more than two decades of data allowing them to observe 
women extended labor market history (see for instance, Connolly and Gregory, 2008; OTHERS?). 
4 A different but related problem would be to model participation into employment.  We do not model participation 
into employment because our dataset does not allow us to do so, as it is made of survivors (individuals not affiliated 
with the Social Security in 2006 are excluded from the sample even if they had a relationship with the Social 
Security in the past).  This implies that the CSWH is not useful to analyze transition from employment to inactivity.  
We do not think this is of major concern since we are focusing our analysis on women who are strongly attached to 
the labor market (as in Connolly and Gregory, 2008). 
5 In addition, the law extended the right to reduce the weekly work load to parents of children aged 8 years old and 




the highest rate of fixed-term contracts in Europe for the last two decades (over one third of all contracts 
are fixed-term contracts).   
 
We find evidence of a PT  penalty that is greater for workers with fixed-term contracts.  After 
accounting  for  workers’  observable  and  unobservable  characteristics,  we  find  that  PT  women  with 
permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 log points lower hourly wage growth per year than their 
FT counterparts, and that PT women with fixed-term contract experience 3.9 log points lower hourly 
wage growth per year then their FT counterparts.  These estimates are considerably large and concerning 
as their size ranges between one-and-a-half and twice the size of the estimated college premium on wage 
growth.  We also find that these estimates are similar to the ones we would obtain if we were to control 
for employer characteristics.  The reason  for this is that the greater loss caused by the occupational 
downgrading and employer turnover that a switch to PT employment may imply seems to be cancelled 
out by workers’ upgrading to better paid industries (or, alternatively, coming from relatively lower paid 
industries to start with ).  Finally, we have found that while wo men in permanent contracts negatively 
self-select into PT employment, the opposite occurs for women in fixed-term contracts.  We believe that 
the positive self-selection into PT fixed-term jobs is due to the dual nature of the Spanish labor market 
and the marginalization of fixed-term contracts.   
 
This paper is closer to Connolly and Gregory (hereafter, CG, 2008) in that it estimates the PT 
pay penalty through various specification of a human capital earnings equation using a long unbalanced 
panel and a fixed effects `within´ estimator approach.  They find that the PT pay penalty in the UK can 
be fully explained through the following four channels: (1) Lower human capital accumulation during PT 
work; (2) Lower returns to PT experience; (3) Occupational downgrading; and (4) Change of employer.  
Methodologically,  our work   differs from  CG  study  in that we estimate the PT pay  penalty through 
various specifications of a h uman capital earnings change equation.  In ad dition, given that our data 
contains information on children in the household, we are able to distinguish between the PT pay penalty 
and the `motherhood pay gap´ (C&G cannot distinguish between mothers and non-mothers).  Finally, our 
analysis  also  distinguishes  between  insiders (th ose  women  with  permanent  contracts)  and  outsiders 
(those with fixed-term contracts).   
 
To our knowledge two other studies have estimate the PT / FT wage differential in Spain using a 
cross-sectional approach with data from the European Community Household Panel Survey (Pissarides 
et al., 2003; and Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).  Both stu dies find evidence of an unadjusted hourly wage 
penalty associated with being a female PT worker (of between 10% and 16%).  In both papers, the PT 
penalty becomes a PT  premium after adjusting for observable characteristics (and self-selection in the 
case of Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).  However, the Pissarides et al.’s PT premium vanishes when potential 
measurement error in hours and PT status a re instrumented with lagged values.  The  authors conclude 
that they are reluctant to believe their estimates as measurement error may still be affe cting their IV 
estimates.  Given that Pagán Rodríguez does not correct for measurement error, and that neither of these 
studies corrects for unobserved quality differences between PT and FT workers, we find these earlier 
findings inconclusive, especially in the light of the anecdotal evidence suggesting that PT jobs in Spain 




Figure 1. Full-time Job Preferences 
 
Source :  2005 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP)—Work Orientations Module 
 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents an overview of the literature.  
Section III describes th e institutional background.   Section  IV  presents  the  data  and  the descriptiv e 
statistics.  Section V explains the methodological approach.  Section VI analyzes the results, and Section 
VII  concludes  with  a  discussion  on  policy  implications.    An  additional  appendix  provides  further 
information on the data and detailed empirical results. 
 
 
I.  Literature on PT Work and PT Earnings Penalty 
 
The usefulness of PT work in achieving economic and individuals’ professional development is and has 
been a prominent and heated debate  among academics, political actors and practitioners in Europe and 
elsewhere (Bardasi and Gornick, 2000; Buddelmeyer et al., 2005).  Supporters of PT work argue that 
employers can use PT work to adjust hours worked to cyclical conditions, facilitating the adjustment of 
production and labor costs and drawing people who were previously unwilling or unable to work into the 
labor  market  (Euwals,  2001).    In  addition,  PT  work  offers  individuals  the  opportunity  for  career 
progression as workers can use part-time jobs as a stepping stone into full employment—moving first 
from  non-employment  into  PT  and  then  into  FT wo rk  (Blank,  1998;  McCall,  1997;  Farber,  1999).  
Similarly, in countries where female employment rate is low, PT work may contribute to raise women’s 
employment  rates  as  reducing  working-time  barriers  may  facilitate  labor  market p articipation 
(Buddelmeyer et al., 2005).  Last but not least, PT work allows individuals to reconcile work and family, 
as many parents (mainly mothers) choose to work PT during the childrearing years.  Good quality PT 
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By Work Status and Contract at Age 30
Age Earnings Profiles of Full-Time and Part-Time Workers
 
Note: Earnings are hourly wages indexed to 1 at the age of 30. Women are aged 30 in 2001, aged 31 in 2002, etc. 
Full-time women were working full-time at the age of 30. Women with indefinite contracts had a permanent 
contract at the age of 30. The work status and the type of contract a woman has can change after the age of 30. 
 
Plot PT pay penalty (raw regression controlling for years, education and province and PT dummy 
interacted with year ) versus year 
(see fig. 1 of Manning and Petrongolo, EJ 2008) 
 
 
Deterrents of PT work, in contrast, argue that  it may increase employers’ fixed costs, such  as 
recruitment  and  training  costs  (REF.)  and  that  it  may  push  part-time  workers  to  become  ‘the  new 
underclass’ (Humphries and Rubery, 1995), as PT workers receive lower wages (Bassi, 1995; Gornick 
and Jacobs, 1996; OECD, 1994; Rubery, 1992; EBRI, 1993; Simpson, 1986) and benefits—in the form 
of  reduced  occupational  benefits  (Campling,  1987;  ILO,  1989;  OECD,  1994),  or  less p ublic  social 
welfare  benefits  (Euzeby,  1988;  Maier,  1992)—,  and  have  limited o pportunities  for  advancement 
compared to similar workers in FT jobs (Rosenfeld, 1993; Tilly, 1990; Conolly and Gregory, 2008; and 
Manning  and  Petrolongo,  2008,  among  others).    Critics  of  PT  work  denounce  that, far from   being 
stepping stones, PT jobs are the ‘hidden brain drain’ of women because women switch from ‘better’ FT 
jobs into lower-skilled occupations where PT opportunities are more readily available and they can find 
the flexibility in working the hours that they seek (the Equal Opportunities Commission, 2005). 




Given the recent surge in  PT employment in  many industrialized countries, and the relative 
concentration of women in PT jobs, many researchers have analyzed the pay differential between PT 
female workers and their FT counterparts.  While the earliest studies focused on the US (Jones and Long, 
1979; Blank, 1990) and the UK (Ermisch and Wright, 1993), the more recent literature has evaluated the 
PT pay penalty in many industrialized countries, such as Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium (Jepsen, 
2001; and Jepsen et al., 2005), Norway (Hardoy and Schøne, 2006), The Netherlands (Hu and Tijdens, 
2003); West Germany (Wolf, 2002), among others.  Most stud ies find a negative unadjusted PT wage 
penalty, the magnitude of which differs substantially across the different countries.  In some countries—
such as, Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium (Jepsen, 2001; Jepsen et al., 2005), Norway (Hardoy and 
Schøne, 2006), and the UK (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008)—, the PT pay penalty vanishes or becomes 
small  when  controlling  for  differences  in  workers  and  job  characteristics  (especially  education  and 
occupation).   In   the  other  studies  (Gallie  et  al.,  1998;  Gornich  and  Jacobs,  1996;  Rubery,  1998; 
Rosenfeld  and  Kalleberg,  1990—COUNTRIES  NOT  AUTHORS), a wag e  gap  remains  and  this 
unexplained part also shows considerable cross-country variation.  Finally, in a third group of countries 
(Australia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain), a PT pay premium is found (Booth and 
Wood, 2008; Pissarides et al., 2003; and Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).   
 
Most of this literature compares the hourly wages of PT female workers with those of FT female 
workers after controlling for all observable characteristics, acknowledging that unobserved heterogeneity 
may still prevail, as women deciding to work PT may have different tastes and preferences about work 
than do women who work FT.  As Hakim (1997) explains while some women are committed to careers 
in the labor market, a second group of women are qualitatively different since they give priority to their 
domestic roles and activities, do not invest in what economists term ‘human capital’ even if they acquire 
education qualifications, transfer quickly and permanently to part-time work as soon as a breadwinner 
husband permits it, choose undemanding jobs ‘with no worries or responsibilities’ when they do work, 
and are hence found concentrated in lower paid and lower gradejobs which offer convenient working 
hours with which they [are] satisfied. (Hakim, 1997, p. 43).  If there are unobserved quality differences 
between  PT  and  FT  workers,  cross-sectional  studies  of  the  PT  wage  effect  will refl ect  an  omitted 
variable bias.  Nevertheless, many of the studies on the PT wage effect have been estimated on cross-
sectional  samples—see,  for  example,  Rosen  (1976),  Simpson  (1986),  Blank  (1990),  and  Hotchkiss 
(1991), Ermisch and Wright (1993), Rodgers (2004), Pagán Rodríguez (2007), Manning and Petrongolo 
(2008), Mumford and Smith (2008), among others.
6   
 
One way to address the unobserved heterogeneity problem is to use panel data and to estimate a 
fixed-effects-‘within’ estimator, in wh ich case, the effect of PT on  wages is identified through those 
workers who switch status (see Booth and Wood, 2005; and Connolly and Gregory, 2008 OTHERS?).
7  
While  having  important  advantages,  longitudinal  analysis  is no t  without  shortcomings.    A frequ ent 
problem arises when there is a small sample size of switchers, especially due to the infrequent transitions 
between FT to  PT work and vice-versa—for instance, Connolly and Gregory (2008) report that in any 
year, fewer than 9% of those in FT work switch to PT work in the UK.  For Spain, Buddelmeyer et al. 
(2005) find that in any year, 1.52% (1.79%) of those women in FT (PT) work switch to PT (FT) work.
8  
In addition, measurement errors of hours and wages, which are common in this literature (Altonji 1986; 
Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001), bias OLS estimates towards zero and magnify the attenuation 
bias in a fixed effects context (Aaronson and French, 2004; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). 
                                                 
6  Although  he  uses  data  from  1995  through  2000,  Pagán  Rodríguez  (2007)  does  not  exploit  the  longitudinal 
characteristics of his data set and pools the data across the different waves. 
7 Alternatively, Hirsch (2005) uses multiple short panels with two observations per worker (one year apart) to 
estimate the effect of switching between FT and PT status on wage changes.  . 
8 Using our sample, we find that, in any given year, 2.94% (1.57%) of women in FT (PT) work switch to PT (FT) 





Given  that  most  studies  use  worker’  survey  data,  measurement  errors  of  key  variables  is  a 
frequent concern in this literature.
9  For instance, the OECD (2002) warns about the possibility of having 
measurement errors in the surve y stemming from the fact that the in terviewed persons provide direct 
information about their own wages, rather than their employers, as is the case with matched employer-
employee  data  or  social  security  records.  Oth ers  have  raised  similar  concerns  (see fo r  instance, 
Pissarides et al., 2003; Naci Mocan an d Erdal Tekin,2003; or Buligescu et al., 2008, among others).  
Most  recently,  Buligescu  et al.,  2008,  find  that  reported  actual  working  hours,  which  are u sually 
observed only for one week, show considerable dispersion and are likely to induce spurious negative 
correlation between working hours and the calculated wage rate.  They argue that it is better to u se 
contractual hours as they do not tend to vary as much from week to week.  Some efforts to reduce the 
effect  of  measurement  error  in  reported  hours  worked  (and  consequently  PT statu s)  include 
instrumenting such variables with their lags.  However, the results indicate that the instruments do not 
always seem to work as they are fairly similar to OLS estimates for some of the countries (Pissarides et 
al., 2003). 
 
Another important identification is the danger of reverse causation: maybe it is low wages that 
‘cause’ PT work, not PT work that ‘causes’ low wages.  This problem is usually addressed by using an 
instrumental variables strategy.  However, for this technique to work well requires a variable that affects 
propensity to work PT but does not have a direct  effect on earnings.  Unfortunately, such a variable is 
extremely  difficult  to  find.    And  albeit  children  and  marital  status  are  frequently  used  as  variables 
affecting the decision to work PT but not the wages earned—see Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Blank, 
1999; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, among others—, it is well established in this literature that “this is 
a very strong assumption that may not, in reality, be any better than the exogeneity assumption that this 
is supposed to replace” (Manning and Petrongolo, page F33, Economic Journal 2008).  Aaronson and 
French (2004) are the only ones that  we know to use an alternative instrument for worked hours, the 
work disincentive of the Social Security system.  They are able to isolate exogenous shifts into PT 
employment resulting from changes in Social Security rules.  
 
 
I.  Economic and Institutional Background  
 
The two most common forms of flexible work arrangements (fixed-term contracts and  PT work) have 
evolved quite differently in Spain.  Both types of contracts were first regulated by law in 1984 with the 
objective  of  adding  flexibility  and  promoting  employment  in a rig id  labor  market with string ent 
employment protection legislation and high levels of unemployment.  While fixed-term employment 
soared, the growth in PT employment was modest, at most.  As a result, since the early 1990s, fixed-term 
employment represents one third of the Spanish labor force (by far, the highest share among European 
countries), whereas the share of PT employment is below one tenth of the labor force (far from the EU 
average  of 1 8%).   The  shy  growth of  PT employ ment  (relative  to other in dustrialized countries)  is 
frequently explained by the fact that PT jobs seem to compete with fixed-term contracts in Spain, as 
employers clearly prefer the latter type to obtain flexible work arrangements (Toharia, 1996; and Guell 
and Petrongolo, 1998, among others).   
 
The surge of fixed-term contracts began to be questioned in the late-1980s when experts started 
to advise against the risk of segmentation with “good” (permanent) jobs and “bad” (fixed-term) jobs—
Segura et al., (1991); Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and Jimeno and Toharia (1993).  The concern was 
that the Spanish labor market would become a dual labor market with workers with fixed-term contracts 
                                                 




holding unstable, low protected and poorly paid jobs, wh ile workers with indefinite contracts enjoyed 
protection and presumably also higher wages.  The reforms of 1994 and 1997 aimed to enhance the use 
of permanent contracts and reduce its cost.  However, both reforms were quite unsuccessful at reducing 
the share of temporary contracts in the labor force—see Kugler et al.(2002) for an analysis of the impact 
of the 1997 reform OTHERS?.   
 
During the 1990s, labor market regulations introduced during the 1990s extended the coverage of 
statutory protection of PT workers to bring it closer to that of FT workers, in terms of redundancy, unfair 
dismissal, holidays, maternity leave and minimum notice.  The major legislative change took place in 
Spain in 1999, with the establishment of clear protection rules for all workers who exerted their rights of 
flexible (and reduced) working hours: it declared a layoff (or non-renovation of contract) invalid if the 
worker  had  previously  asked  for work-week red uction  due to   family  or other fam ily  dependent 
responsibilities.
10  This law clearly reduced workers’ risks of reducing their work week for workers with 
permanent and fixed-term contracts—we claim that after this law change, workers who wanted to reduce 
their work week could do so without the risk of having to leave their job and move to a ‘bad’ job.  In the 
results section, we use this policy change as a means to evaluate the robustness of our results on the 
effect of job protection on PT penalty.  
 
Both  types  of  work  arrangements  are d isproportionately  occupied  by  women,  with 41%  of 
contracts among women being fixed-term compared to 35% among men, and 15% of women working in 
PT jobs compared to 3% of men (European Community Household Panel Survey, 1994-1999).  While 
women’s role in home production may imply that women have stronger preferences than men for P T 
jobs, this does not necessarily imply different gender differences for fixed-term contracts (as a permanent 
contract is at least as desirable as a temporary one, given that it would commit the firm rather than the 
worker to costly procedures in case of separation).  Using data from the 1994 through 1999 waves of the 
European  Community  Household  Panel  Survey  (ECHPS),  Pissarides  et al. (2003)  find  evidence 
suggesting that the unequal allocation of genders across fixed-term contracts and PT work in Spain stems 
from employer discrimination as opposed to workers’ comparative advantage.  They find that, after 
controlling for comparative advantages by conditioning the likelihood of being in involuntary PT work 
on human capital and family characteristics, whose effect on employment arrangements was allowed to 
differ across genders, single women in Spain are 10% more likely to be involuntary PT workers than  
single man.  Similarly, they find that fixed-term contracts are 4% more frequent among single women 
than  single  men  in  Spain,  and  that  family  ties re inforces  this  tendency,  with  married  women  with 
children  being about  9% more  likely than married  men  to hold  a fix ed-term  contract.   In  addition, 
exploring workers’ preferences, these authors do not find evidence that women are particularly happier 
(or less unhappy) than men on PT jobs or with fixed-term contracts, as they find that PT jobs (fixed-term 
contracts) in Spain tend to reduce both males’ and females’ overall job satisfaction by 16% (25%).   
 
The evidence on wage differences by type of contract or PT status h as been scarce in Spain 
(mainly due to the lack of large databases containing individual information on wages until recently), and 
based on cross-sectional analysis.  Given that wages are set by collective agreements and that these do 
not allow workers to be paid differently on type of contract, it seems reasonable to think that employers 
do not discriminate against workers by type of contract.  Despite this fact, several empirical studies find 
that  permanent  workers  earn  around  10%  more,  for  men,  and  about  5%  more,  for  women,  after 
                                                 
10 In 1995, the law first recognized the right to flexible work week for parents of children aged 6 years and younger 
or workers with dependents.  However, this law was unclear on how it was going to be implemented and to what 
extent employers had to oblige on it.  While it may have had some effect on workers with permanent contract, it 
was irrelevant for workers with fixed-term contracts.  It was  not until 1999 that clear protection rules for all 
workers who exerted their rights of flexible (and reduced) working hours were established.  In addition, the 1999 




controlling for observed heterogeneity in personal and job-related characteristics and for selection into 
type of contract (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; Hernanz, 2002; and De la Rica, 2004).
11  Moreover, there is 
evidence that workers with fixed-term contracts segregate into low-paying firms and occupations (De la 
Rica, 2004).  Turning to the evidence on PT / FT wage differential, the evidence on wage differences 
between PT and FT workers in Spain has found that there is an ‘unexpected’ (in the light of the anecdotal 
evidence and job satisfaction indicators) wage premium to working PT (Pagán Rodríguez, 2007), or no 
effect  (Pissarides  et al.,  2003).
12    However,  failure  of  correcting  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  and 
measurement problems raise caution before taken these esti mates at face value (as acknowledged by 
Pissarides et al., 2003) 
 
EXPLAIN WHY YOU THINK IT IS IMPO RTANT TO DO THE ANALYSIS SEPARATE 
FOR THE 4 GROUPS.  MENTION IF OTHERS CONTROL FOR TYPE OF CONTRACT AND WHY.  
NEED to add a paragraph on subgroup estimates and who controls for fixed-term contract and why.  
Look if Nacho (U. OLavide) has look at the wage gap between <permanent and fixed-term contracts 
using Muestra….  
 
FALTA: REF FERNANDEZ AND LA CUESTA 
 
Other legislative changes of concern? 
 
 
II.  The Data and Descriptive Statistics (some of this text can go into a data appendix) 
 
We use data from the 2006 wave of the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (hereafter 
CSWH), which is a 4% non-stratified random sample of the population registered with the 
Social Security Administration in 2006.
13  The CSWH consists of nearly 1.1 million individuals 
and provides the complete labor market history of the selected individuals back to 1967.  It 
provides information on: (1) socio-demographic characteristics of the worker (such as, sex, date 
of birth, country of birth); (2) worker’s job information (such as, the type of contract—fixed-
term versus permanent contract—, the PT status, the occupation, and the dates the employment 
spell started and ended, the monthly earnings);  (3) employer’s information (such as, industry—
defined at the three-digits Spanish classification code or NACE—, public versus private 
sector—, the number of workers of the firm, and the location—at the province level).
14  
                                                 
11 FALTA JIMENO TOHARIA, 1993.  To identify participation into fixed-term versus permanent contract, 
Hernanz (2002) uses gender, age, level of education, industry, public or private employer, firm size and region and 
working day duration (and occupation on the case of the estimation of the SES sample).  De la Rica ( 2007) uses 
age, tenure and education, controls for occupation (at one-digit) and the rate of fixed-term contracts by autonomous 
community.  De la Rica (2007) does not find evidence of selection into type of contract for females (while there is 
selection for males).  Hernanz’s estimates are not presented separately by sex, therefore we are unable to know 
whether her evidence of selection in the whole sample would hold when the analysis focuses on women. 
12 To identify participation into fixed-term versus permanent contract, Pagán Rodríguez (2007) uses age, level of 
education, marital status, number of children 5 years old or younger, number of children between 6 and 12 years 
old, region and household income.  He finds evidence of sample selection among women working PT (but not 
among those working FT).   
13 For a description of the CSWH and the sampling strategy, see Argimón and González, 2006. 
14 Reported earnings suffer from right censoring and we have eliminated from the analysis all individuals that had 
their earnings capped at least once during their working history (7.5% of total).  We have computed the main 
results of the paper including observations with top coded income and we did not find any difference with the 




Although not reported in the CSWH, other variables such as working experience (in FT and PT 
work) and tenure can be easily calculated.  As explained in the Appendix, these data comes 
matched to data from the 2006 Spanish Municipal Registry of Inhabitants (Padrón Municipal de 
Habitantes) which portrays information on the individual’s education level, and number and 
date of birth of each of the members in the household.  We believe that these variables are key 
into explaining women’s selection into the type of contract and employment. 
 
Following the most of the European and Canadian literature, we classify a worker working PT if 
he works 30 hours or less each we ek, and FT if he works 31 or m ore hours each week.  The CSWH 
compares well with other datasets frequently used in studies of the Spanish labor market, such as the 
Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS). Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics by age group comparing 
the CSWH and the LFS. In general, the distribution of individuals by the type of contract, permanent or 
fixed-term, and by FT status is very similar in the two datasets and across age groups. Considering the 
more aggregated results, we can see that two-thirds of the working population holds a permanent contract 
and  a  bit  over  one  tenth  of  workers  have  a p art-time  job.  We  also  find  that  the  incidence  of  PT 
employment is very different across gender groups, being much higher for women than for men (20.8 % 




Descriptive Statistics by Age and Sex 
CSWH versus Labor Force Survey (LFS). Year=2006 
(LFS distribution in parenthesis) 
 
  Type of Contract** FT- versus PT-time Status** 
  Permanent  Fixed-term  Full-time*   Part-time*  
All ages   68.97 (66.74)   31.03 (33.26)   88.35 (87.89)   11.65 (12.11)  
16-19   21.35 (22.13)   78.65 (77.87)   81.57 (74.17)   18.43 (25.83)  
20-24   45.17 (37.62)   54.83 (62.38)   83.12 (80.55)   16.88 (19.45)  
25-54   71.05 (69.31)   28.95 (30.69)   89.35 (88.86)   10.65 (11.14)  
55 and older   81.01 (85.85)   18.99 (14.15)   85.71 (88.93)   14.29 (11.07)  
  
Males   68.55 (66.04)   31.45 (33.96)   94.70 (95.75)   5.30 (4.25)  
16-19   19.42   80.58   88.15   11.85  
20-24   42.63   57.37   89.74   10.26  
25-54   70.79   29.21   96.11   3.89  
55 and older   79.85   20.15   89.50   10.50  
 
Females   69.59 (65.36)   30.41 (34.64)   79.13 (75.97)   20.87 (24.03)  
16-19   25.51   74.49   67.44   32.56  
20-24   48.49   51.51   74.48   25.52  
25-54   71.39   28.61   80.02   19.98  
55 and older   83.72   16.28   76.83   23.17  
Total  
*For all employed workers (self-employed and employees)  




Following CG, we restrict our sample to women whose full labor market history to date can be 
observed.  We focus our analysis on wage and salary workers, that is, we exclude from the analysis self-
employed individuals.
15  We confine our selection to birth cohorts between 1961 and 1978, implying that 
women in our sample will be aged between 24 and 45 years.  The oldest women are 24 years old in 1985, 
and they are followed until age 45 in 2006.  The potentially youngest women are born in 1978, and they 
are aged 28 in 2006.
16  The reason for dropping women younger than 24 years old is that  we want to 
eliminate  part-time  work  by  students.   In ad dition,  we  confine  our  analysis  to  women  living  in 
households of five or fewer members (96.5% of the sample).  The reason for restricting our attention to 
women 45 and younger living in households of five or fewer members is that we want to have accurate 
information on the number and age of children, which is unavailable in the CSWH but can be obtained 
from the Spanish Municipal Registry of Inhabitants.  As exp lained in the Ap pendix, information on 
family composition becomes noisy for older women and for women living in large households, but is 
considerably accurate relative to Census data for the sub-population of women under analysis.  Finally, 
because we want to confine the analysis to women with a strong attachment to the labor force, we further 
restrict our sample to women who record at least three years in wage and  salary work after having 
worked at least one year FT (this is the same procedure as the one used by CG),. This sample selection 
results in an unbalanced panel of 582,974 observations on 76,025 women.   
 
Compared to other data, the advantage of using the CSWH is threefold.  First, the CSWH is a 
very large sample, which is important because PT work and switching from FT to PT (and vice-versa) is 
a relatively infrequent event, and more so when we focus the analysis on women strongly attached to the 
labor market.  Of our sample of 75,062 women, we observe 16,469 switching from FT to PT (or vice-
versa) at least once in our sample, providing us with 34,955 observations of switchers.  Second, the 
CSWH provides the complete labor market history for those women registered in the S ocial Security 
Administration in 2006, for up to 21 years.  The length of the panel gives the opportunity to trace 
women’s earnings and occupation trajectories for the first half of the employment life-cycle in the case 
of  older  cohorts  and  for  substantial  periods  even  for y ounger  cohorts.    Third,  it  contains  reliable 
information on monthly earnings, tenure, experience in FT an d PT work, as the in formation comes 
directly from the payroll records.  Measurement error due to recall bias or self-reporting for these key 
variables is minimized with this data set.  Similarly, non-response is not an issue.  Fourth, the dataset has 
rich information on individual characteristics, including education, age, ethnicity, marital status, and 
number and age of children in the household. 
 
There are drawbacks with the ad ministrative data used.  One of t he biggest concerns with the 
data  at  hand  is  that  we o bserve  contractual  hours  worked  (as  in C G;  and  Buligescu  et al.,  2008).  
Although  these data   are  considered  to be sup erior  to wo rkers’  survey  data  (as  we  discussed  in th e 
Introduction and Section II), we have noticed that, in Spain, contractual hours consistently underreport 
actual worked hours for PT workers relative to FT workers leading to a differential measurement error by 
                                                 
15 If the worker held more than one job during the course of a year, the analysis focuses on his main job, defined as 
the job in which the worker has a permanent contract—if he has one—, and in the case of multiple jobs with the 
same type of contract, the one for which the individual worked the largest number of days in a given year.  This 
approach is similar to the one used by the Spanish Statistics National Institute (INE) to define the worker’s main 
job in the Labor Force Survey.  About one fourth of the sample held more than one job in a given year, and the 
average number of jobs held in one year is 1.53.     
16 The reason our potentially smallest cohort is born in 1978 and aged 28 in 2006—instead of being born in 1982 
and aged 24 in 2006—, is that we h ad to restrict the sample to women who were at least 18 years old in 1996 
because that was the last time the variable education was updated nationwide.  Because of this restriction we lose 





17   Using data from the Use of Time Survey, Table A5 in the Appendix provides evidence that 
PT workers consistently work a greater number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to their 
FT counterparts, which would bias upwards the hourly wages of PT workers (relative to FT  workers) 
leading to underestimating the PT wage penalty. To address this problem, we focus our attention on the 
wage change as opposed to wage levels, and drop from our sample of analysis the observations of wage 
change observed exactly when status changes.
18  Assuming that differential measurement error by PT 
status is an individual-employment-status fixed effect, our approach circumvents the problem, as shown 
in Section VI.  An additional problem is that the CSWH does not keep track of those individuals who 
exit  the  Social  Security  Records.   Th erefore,  the  CSWH  is n ot  useful  to analy ze  transitions  from 
employment to inactivity.   
 
Table 2 presents the sample sizes and descriptive statistics of  the key covariates pooling the 
observations that are used in the longitudinal analysis.  The main focus of the present study is to analyze 
how the change in hourly wage varies by FT status and by contract type (fixed-term versus permanent).  
The data are therefore divided in four groups, classified by FT status and type of contract.
19  Among the 
sample under study, women between 24 and 45 years old strongly attached to the labor force, we find 
that those with permanent contracts represent a bit  over half of the sample (52.6%).  In addition, the 
percentage of women working in PT employment is similar across the two types of contracts, with PT 
employment representing close to 10% of jobs in each group. 
                                                 
17 These can be explained by employers having an incentive to underreport contractual hours to reduce total labor 
costs, and being able to act upon it in a much easier way for PT jobs (since they are less protected by the law and 
the unions) than for FT jobs.   
18 By doing this we drop 26,328 (5.6%) observations from 16,469 individuals.  Notice, however, that we observe 
subsequent wage growth for most of these 16,469 individuals who have switched from or to PT employment.  
19 Although one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, it should be noted 





Descriptive Statistics  
Women Strongly Attached to the Labor Force, 1985-2006 CSWH 
(24 to 45 years old) 
 
  Permanent contract  Fixed-term contract 
  FT worker  PT worker  FT worker  PT worker 










Log of current hourly earnings 









Age 24 to 29 years old 
(percent) 
36.17  31.78  59.49  37.71 
Age 30 to 34 years old 
(percent) 
27.75  35.13  21.79  30.24 
Age 35 to 39 years old 
(percent) 
20.10  19.61  10.80  18.15 
Age 40 to 45 years old 
(percent) 
15.98  13.47  7.91  13.90 
Cohabiting (percent)  80.47  80.02  78.50  77.36 
Without children (percent)  79.07  49.76  77.21  58.71 
With children 0 to 2 years old 
(percent) 
8.91  20.99  6.99  12.07 
With children 3 years old 
(percent) 
1.71  5.70  1.67  3.88 
With children 4 to 6 years 
old (percent) 
3.56  8.56  3.98  6.96 
With children older than 6 
years old (percent) 
6.75  14.99  10.15  18.39 
High-school dropout (percent)  34.69  41.87  34.93  46.50 
High-school graduate (percent)  37.28  38.04  31.63  30.25 
College graduate or above 
(percent) 
28.03  20.09  33.34  23.25 




















Unemployment (in years)         
Public servant (percent)  16.33  0.26  5.73  1.59 








Firm size—equal 1 if 200 
employees or more 













White Collar (percent)  22.64  12.59  22.18  13.82 
Change of employer (percent)  7.35  7.32  34.03  24.58 










Number of observations  319,061  11,237 129,825 8,409
Number of individuals  51,501  5,021  45,971  5,038 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All hourly wages are deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) 
deflator (base year = 2006).  Although one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, it 
should be noted that these four categories are mutually exclusive 
†
  Difference in the means between layoff and plant closing are significantly different at the 90% confidence level 
††
  Difference in the means between layoff and plant closing are significantly different at the 95% confidence level 
†††




When comparing the variables for women working in PT versus FT jobs, Table 2 shows 
that PT workers have lower (raw) hourly  wages and their (raw) hourly wage grows at a lower 
rate than FT  workers.  However, this cannot be used as a reliable estim ate of the pay  penalty 
that a given woman would suffer if she changed from FT to PT status because women working 
PT are very different from those working FT, as found in the subsequent rows  of Table 2.  For 
instance, we observe that PT workers are older and more likely to have children of all ages than 
FT workers.  In addition, women in PT jobs are also more likely to be high-school dropouts and 
less likely to be college  graduates than women in FT jobs, and the y have on average more 
experience in PT jobs and less in FT j obs than their FT counterparts.    Looking at employer 
differences across the two groups, women in PT employment are concentrated in private sector, 
small firms and blue-collar occupations, and are less likely to upgrade occupations (relative to  
FT workers). These findings also sugge st that PT workers may also segregate into low-pa ying 
firms and low-paying jobs.  Overall th e observed differences for PT versus F T workers hold 
across  the two ty pes  of  contract.   However,   some  of these difference s—like  the (raw) PT 
penalty (measured both at levels  and at changes), the age and  education differences, and the 
employer  size—are  more  pronounced  for worker s  with fixed-term   contracts than  with 
permanent contracts.  In contrast, other differences—like the likelihood of having children, the 
difference in experience and the likelihood of being a public servant—are more pronounced for 
workers with permanent contracts than those with  fixed-term contracts.  Finally, we find that 
women with PT fixed-term contracts are more likely to change employers than those with F T 
fixed-term contracts.  No such difference is  observed among women with permanent contracts.   
We also observe that women in PT jobs with  permanent contracts have less te nure with their 
employer than those in FT perm anent jobs (no such difference is ob served among fixed-term 
contracts, which is of no surprise as t hese contracts cannot exceed three y ears and involve 
frequent turnover).  
 
Table 2 also allows us to compare workers with fixed-term contracts versus those with 
permanent jobs.  Similar to the PT status comparison, we find evidence of differences across the 
two groups.  First, we find that workers with fi xed-term contracts earn lower (raw) wages than 
those with permanent contracts.  However, this difference is likely to be explained by the fact 
that different types of women ar e employed in the different types of contracts.  For instance , 
Table 2 shows that women with fixed-term contracts are younger, less likely to be high-school 
graduates, but more likely to  be college graduate, more likely to have children older than six 
years old, more likely to be working in large firms and to change e mployers than those with 
permanent jobs.  Some of these differences, such as the PT penalty and the age difference,  are 
more pronounced for women working FT than those working PT.  In contrast, other differences, 
such as education, are  more pronounced for those working PT than for those working FT.   In 
addition, we also find clear differences across the two types of contract depending on whether  
they are FT or PT workers.  On the one hand, we find that PT workers with fixed-term contracts 
are  less likely to  have  children,
20  less likely to  have  experience (in bot h  FT and P T 
employment), and more likely to be public servants than their counterparts with perm anent 
contracts.  In contrast, no such difference in  the likelihood of having children by contract type 
appears  for  FT  working  women,   and   FT worker s  with fixed-term   contract  have  more  PT 
experience  and less FT experience and are less  likely  to  be  public servants than their  
counterparts with permanent contracts.
21    
 
                                                 
20 This finding is consistent with results found in the literature that suggest that female workers in Spain 
prefer to wait and have a protected job before entering motherhood (Ahn and Mira, 2001; Gutierrez-
Domenech, 2008; de la Rica and Iza, 2005; García Ferreira and Villanueva, 2007). 
21 Although our summary statistics do not suggest that workers with fixed-term contracts segregate into 
small firms or blue-collar occupations compared to workers with indefinite contracts (as in De la Rica, 
2004), there are many reasons that can explain the different results.  First, both samples differ drastically 
as De la Rica (2004) includes both males and female full-time workers during the mid-1990s and does not 
focuses on women during their childrearing years as we do.  In addition, the definitions of the different 




(NEED TO ADD : , IS THIS DIFFERENCE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT?) 
 
 
III.  Methodology 
 
Our objective is to exploit  longitudinal data in Spain to analyze the direct consequences of  PT 
employment  on subseque nt  earnings  growth  and  career  trajectories.  However, given th e 
striking  segmentation  of the Spanish   labor m arket,  we analy ze  the PT penalty b y  type  of 
contract and explore the effectiveness of job protection into reducing the potential PT penalty. 
 
For ease of t he exposition, we use  a simple dummy variable approach to  measure the 
change in log wage differ ences associated with PT status and type of contract, conditional on 
controls (this approach is similar to the one used by Hirsch, 2005; and CG) OTHERS??.
22  The 
form of the wage growth equation model is: 
 
(1)    it i it it it it it it FT PT FT PT X LnW               1  
 
Here,  it LnW  is the change in the natural log  of real hourly earnings of individual i between 
year t-1 and year t;  it X  is a vector of individual and job characteristics for individual i at time t, 
with β the corresponding coefficient vector (including an intercept).   it X  includes age dummies, 
marital status dummy, presence of children in the ho usehold dummies (aged 0 to 2 years old, 3 
years old, 4 to 6 years old, and older than 6 years old), ethnicity dummy, three dummies for 
completed education (one for “high school drop-out”; one for “high-school graduate”; and one 
for “college graduate or above”), industry and occupation dummies at year t-1; experience and 
its square (in PT and FT jobs) at year t-1; previous tenure at year t-1 (with breaks at 1, 2, 3, and 
6  years),  a change of occupation at  year  t-1,  and change of em ployer  dummy  at y ear  t-1.  
Because  there  has been m uch  debate  on whet her  variables  that control for em ployer 
characteristics or change in occupation  or employers ought to be included in the specification  
(see  discussion  in the next section), we pr esent  alternative  specification  to evaluate   the 
robustness of the results and understand the underlying mechanism behind the (raw) PT penalty.  
All regressions use the H uber/White estimator of variance.  it PT  is a binary variable equal to  
one if the worker’s principal job is PT in year t-1;  it FT  is a binary variable equal to one if the 
worker  holds a per manent  contract  at  time  t-1.    The  error te rm  includes  both  a rand om 
component μi with mean zero and constant variance, and a worker-specific fixed effect i  . 
 
Using  the longitudinal panel characteristi cs,  we  estimate  the fo llowing  fixed-effect 
equation (2): 
 
            i it i i i it i it i it i it i it FT PT FT PT FT FT PT PT X X LnW LnW                       ' ' ' ' 1
 
Notice that, as in CG, the effect of PT work on earnings growth is identified through those who 
switch status, but (in contrast with these  authors) we do not  use the observation of the  year the 
switch occurs—to avoid  using a wage change  that compares hourly wages in FT  versus PT 
status (or vice-versa) and mitigating the differe ntial measurement error in cont ractual hours by 
PTstatus.
                                                 
22 Earnings change function parameters differ between PT and FT status and type of contract, but the gaps 
in  the  wage  change  estimated  using  the  dummy  variable  approach  differ  little fro m  those  based  on 






The Part-time Penalty 
Using Contractual versus Imputed Hours 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Ln(real hourly wage)  One year change of  
Ln(real hourly wage) 
One year change of Ln(real hourly 
wage)
 
  Cross-Section Fixed-Effects Cross-Section Fixed-Effects Cross-Section Fixed-Effects 
Computing hourly wages using 
CONTRACTUAL hours 
-0.066***  +0.060***  -0.06***  -0.02***  -0.030***  -0.025*** 
Computing hourly wages using 
imputed EFFECTIVELY 
worked hours 
-0.232***  -0.094***  -0.15***  -0.09***  -0.016**  -0.015*** 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. All regressions include year, age and education dummies. A negative number indicates a penalty for part-time workers. 
 Excluding the year of switching: excluding observations for which work status changed from full to part-time or vice versa. 
 




Although most of the literature focuses on hourl y wage levels as the LHS variable, our paper 
analyzes the hourly wage growth.  T he reason for this is that we have identified a differenti al 
measurement error by PT status when using contractual hours.  We have found evidence that PT 
workers consistently work a greater number of hours in excess of contractual  hours relative to 
their FT counterparts, which (if uncorr ected for) would bias upw ards the hourly wages of PT 
workers (relative to FT workers) leading to underestimating the PT wage penalty.  The first two 
columns of Table 4 show evidence of this.   The top two columns of Table 4 show th e PT 
penalty adjusted for age, education, and year dummies when the LHS variable is measured with 
contractual  hours and usi ng  the OLS  pooled  specification  ( colum n  1) and the fixed-effect 
specification (column 2), respectively.  While the O LS specification shows a  6.6 percentage-
points penalty for women working PT compared to their FT counterparts, the penalty becomes a 
6 percentage-points premium when correcting for unobserved heterogeneity using a fixed-effect 
specification (and similar to Pissarides et al., 2003; and Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).  However, the 
bottom two columns show the sam e estimates when hourly wages have been com puted using 
imputed  reported hours in stead  of contractua l  hours—while imputed ho urs  are not free  of 
measurement error, they ought to not have the differential measurement error by PT status that 
we are concerned with co ntractual hours.
23  In such c ase, the OLS specification shows a 23.4 
percentage-points PT penalty that becomes a 9 pe rcentage-points penalty with the fixed-effects 
specification.  These results clearly highlight that the levels specification when using contractual 
hours underestimates the PT wage penalty.  In addition, the reduction of the PT penalty in both 
cases provides evidence of negative self-selection, indicating that those worker s selecting into 
PT are less motivated workers than those who re main in FT employment.  Note however,  that 
since  both esti mates  of hourl y  wages  have a  measurement  error problem (a differential  
measurement error for those computed with contractual hours; and a general measurement error 
for those computed with imputed reported hours) it is likely that part of the observed reduction 
on the PT penalty is due to attenuation  bias due to measurement error by estimating the fixed-
effects estimator as opposed to the cross-section estimate.   
 
To address this problem, we focus our attention on the wage  change as opposed to wag e 
level, and drop from our sample of analysis the observations of wage change observed exactly 
when status changes (last  two columns of Table 4).  Assum ing that differential measur ement 
error by PT status is an individual-e mployment-status fixed effect, our appro ach circumvents 
the problem.  Under this assu mption, estimates in the top two colum ns ought to be free of  
differential measurement error and superior to the estimates in the bottom two columns, as these 
have used imputed reported hours, which are known to generate more spurious correlation than 
contractual hours  This time around, the cross-s ection OLS estimates show a larger PT penalty 
when the hourly wage change is calculated with  the contractual hours (-3. 3 percentage points) 
than the imputed hours (-1.6 percentage points).  Again, this penalty decreases with the fixed-
effects specification suggesting that there is negative self-selection into PT:
24 
 
Finally, although our specification does not account for selection by type of contract and by 
PT  status, b y  controlling  for num ber  and age  of  children and education,   and em ployer 
characteristics, we are de facto controlling for the same information that many researchers have 
used when and instrumental variables approach correction (see footnotes 11 and 12).  In the case 
of selection into FT / PT  employment, most researchers use family composition variables to 
identify participation into PT employment (Blank, 199 ?; Pissarides et  al., 2003; OTHERS) 
arguing that these variables do not explain wages.  Similarly, in the case of selection by type of 
contract, researchers use employer’s characteristics, such as private versus public sector or firm 
                                                 
23 Reported hours have been imputed by regressing contractual hours on effectively worked hours, age , 
work status and education dummies.   
24 The top estimates of the  middle two columns continue to have the differential measurement error 
problem  as observations  in which  the  wage  change  is calcu lated  with  FT an d  PT  hourly  wages  are 
included in the sample.  As in the first two columns, the PT penalty is greater when using imputed hours 




size.  We find the assum ption that these variables  explain participation but not wage (or wag e 
growth in our case) difficult to believe  and, therefore, prefer using the information directly in 
the  wage eq uation,  acknowledging  that  selection into the diffe rent  types of jobs cannot   be 




IV.  Results 
 
Table 5 presents our pooled cross-sectional and fixed-effects estimates of the PT penalty  using 
data from the CSWH, and controlling for different covariates.  Panel A shows esti mates for the 
whole sample, whereas Panel B shows the estimates  for workers with fixed-term contracts and 
those with permanent contracts.  Looking first at Panel A, we see that the pooled cross-sectional 
estimates always report a smaller PT penalty than the longitudinal fixed-effects ones, suggesting 
that there may be positive sam ple selection into PT  jobs in Spain.  At first, th is finding may 
seem surprising (given the anecdotal evidence that PT jobs tend to be involuntary jobs, in which 
workers are discriminated into).  However, when we estimate the differential effects by contract 
type (Panel B), clearly the positive sample selection seems to be driven by t hose workers with 
fixed-term contracts.  For PT workers with permanent contracts, comparison of columns 2 and 3 
provide  evidence  of negative sam ple  selection:   Am ong  workers with permanent contracts, 
those moving to PT employment are intrinsically different in taste and preferences about work 
than those in FT em ployment: Those switching to  PT employment are less committed to their  
careers in the labor market , and would have had lower wage gr owth had they remained in FT 
work.  For women with permanent contracts, comparing the second and third columns of Panel 
B shows that when we correct for unobserved heterogeneity, the PT penalty adjusted for worker 
characteristics falls from 3.8 to 2.9 log points.  This reduction of more than one fift h of the 
penalty  occurs  because  PT  women  with  permanent  contracts  have less  work  oriented 
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Sample size   468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532 
(# individuals)  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). 
 indicates that the difference of the estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 5% level.   




The story is quite different for women with fixed-term contracts.  First, the evidence shows that 
PT women are less well-educated, and have  more children than those in FT jobs causing the  
unadjusted PT penalty (column 1 of Panel B) fall more than one fifth, from 3.5 to 2.7 log points, 
when controlling for worker characteristics (column 2 of Panel B).
25  However, once we control 
for unobserved heterogeneity using the fixed-effect specification (column 3 of Panel B), we find 
that the PT penalty  rises to 3.9 l og points, suggesting that there is positive selection into PT  
work for women with fixed-term contracts.  Given the striking  segmentation of the S panish 
labor market, fixed-term contracts have become the jobs offered in the secondary labor market.  
These  jobs are known to be unstable, low prot ected,  poorly  paid (see Seg ura  et al., 1991;  
Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Jimeno and Tohari a, 1993), and segregated in l ow-paying firms 
and low-paying occupations (De la Rica, 200 4).  Given the marginalization and discrimination 
suffered among workers in fixed-term  contracts in Spain (Pissaride et al., 2003), those who 
decide to work PT are those who know they can do so without risking to lose their job, that is, 
those who are more motivated to work and who can convince employers to keep them (or hire 
them)  despite  working PT.  Seen fro m  this perspective, evidence of positive self-selection  
among PT women with fixed-term contracts is no longer striking.  
 
  After accounting for workers’ observable and unobservable characteristics, we find that 
PT women with permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 lo g points lower hourly wage 
growth  per  year  than  their  FT count erparts,  and  that PT wo men  with fixed-term   contract 
experience 3.9 log points lower hourly wage growth per year then their FT counterparts.  How 
large are these estimates?  We claim that these estimates are considerably large and concerning.  
For instance, compared to the effect of education on hourly wage growth, we find that having a 
college  degree or  more  increases wo men’s  hourly  wage growth b y  2 lo g  points  per  year 
compared to women without a high-school degree.  Therefore, the size of the PT penalty is 
almost one-and-a-half that of the colleg e premium among women with permanent contract and 
nearly doubles that of the college premium among women with fixed-term contract.  Notice also 
that the PT penalty  for women with fixed-term  contracts is one fo urth larger (and statisticall y 
significantly so) than for women with permanent contracts, suggesting that negative relationship 
between job protection and PT penalty. 
 
  Columns 4 and 5 show the inclusion of employer characteristics—such as whether the 
employer is in the public  or private sector, the size of the em ployer, and the occupation—, as 
additional controls.  Whether to include such covariates in the specification has been the source 
of many academic discussions in this literature.  The reason is that women who work PT may 
segregate  into jobs or occupations with lo w-wage  growth.  As explained  by  Manning  and 
Petrongolo (2008), “if this is the case, controlling for such covariates will only, at best, provide 
an estimate of the PT penalty if women in PT employment are compared to those in FT 
employment in similar low-wage growth jobs or occupations.  At the same time, an estimate that 
does not control for these characteristics may exaggerate the true PT penalty as part of the 
reason FT and PT women work in different jobs or occupations is the differences in the labor 
market experience they possess.”   Although controlling for employer characteristics has a small 
effect on the size of the PT penalty  for both workers with fixed-term and permanent contracts, 
the story varies again by type of contract.  For workers with fixed-term contracts, controlling for 
employer characteristics (moving from columns 3 to 5 in Panel  B) reduces the PT penalty by 
5% (the estimates falls from  3.9 to 3 .7 log points).  In contrast, for workers  with permanent 
contracts, the PT penalty increases by 7% (from 2.9 to 3.1 log points).  The s tory for workers 
with fixed-term contracts is a  story of PT workers downgrading into jobs or occupations with 
lower hourly wage growth.  In contrast, for workers with permanent contracts those working PT 
were  either  already  more  concentrated  in  low-wage  growth  jobs  (compared  to their   FT 
counterpart) before moving into PT,  or when they switched to PT they  moved to jobs wit h 
higher wage growth.  Aft er controlling for em ployer characteristics, PT women wage growth 
                                                 
25 While a similar decrease is observed for women with permanent contracts, the size  of the decrease is 




rises at an even lower rate than their FT counterparts (this occurs, independently of the fact that 
PT jobs may be more likely to be in low-paying jobs as observed in Table 2 and explained  in 
Section IV). 
 
  Columns 6 and 7 show the inclusion of industry as an additional control. Here, the story 
is the same for both types of contracts: the PT penalty is even larger if we  control for industry.  
While,  on average, wo men  in PT emplo yment  are  segregated in industries with low-wage 
growth compared to the F T counterparts (as illustrated by the reduction in the  cross-sectional 
estimates of the PT penalty—moving from columns 4 to 6), the PT penalty increases when we 
move from columns 5 to  7, that is when we a dd an industry control to the s pecification that 
corrects for unobserved heterogeneity.  Women swit ching to PT jobs either move to industries 
with higher wage growth than their FT counterparts, or they were already working in industries 
with low-wage growth.  When controlling for industry, we find that the PT penalty increases by 
one fourth (more than one tenth),—from 3.7 to 4 .6 log points (3.1 to 3.5 log points)—, for 
workers with fixed-term (permanent) contracts. 
 
  Finally, columns 8 and 9  control for whether the worker has changed of em ployer or 
occupation.    Again, inclusion of such covariates   is not entirely   clear-cut as  a  change o f 
employer  (and occupation)  may  be ne cessary  when switching to PT work.  Adding such  
controls  leads to a decre ase  in the P T  penalty  for workers w ith  both  types  of contra cts, 
suggesting that there is occupational downgrading (this finding is consistent with evidence from 
other surveys, such as Montgomery and Cosgrove (1995), Steve ns et al. (2004); Manning and 
Petrongolo (2008); CG, among others), and employer turnover.  The decrease in the PT penalty 
is larger (17% reduction versus a 13 % reduction) for women with permanent contracts than 
those with fixed-term contracts, leaving the PT penalty  to 2.9 log points for the former to 4.0 
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Sample 
size  
468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532  468,532   
(# 
individuals) 
75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063  75,063   
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). 





Table 6 provides more detail of the fixed-effects estimates as we successively add additional 
covariates.  Worth highlighting is the relevance  of the following three vari ables in explaining 
the PT penalty: the experience in FT and PT jobs, an d the change in experience within the  year 
the wage growth is  measured (the latter variab le is a proxy  for whether the worker has s pent 
some time out of employment within that year).  Clearly, past labor market history matter when 
explaining the PT penalty.
26  Moving from columns 3 to 4 increases the PT pen alty, indicating 
that those women going into PT employment have accumulated some comparative advantage in 
PT  jobs (as  they  have accu mulated  more  PT e xperience).   If we fail to control for such 
experience, the PT penalty appears smaller than it truly is.  Finally, moving from columns 4 to 5 
has the opposite effect.  Since the switch to PT j obs is likely to bring some period of inactivity 
or unemployment, accounting for this lowers the PT penalty.   
 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
Using the 2006 wave of the Continuo us Sample of Working Histories (hereafter CSWH),  an 
unbalanced panel obtained from the Social Secur ity records that covers em ployment history 
from 1985 to 2006, we explore the differences in the PT / FT  wage growth f or prime aged 
women strongly attached to the labor force, distinguishing by their type of contract.  We control 
for  worker’s  socio-demographic  characteristics,  worker’s  previous  employment  history, 
employer’s characteristics, and whether the work er switches occupation or employer.  Finally, 
the longitudinal analysis provides a method for controlling for unmeasured work-specific skills 
or preferences fixed across jobs.   
  
Our estimates provide evidence of a differential impact of PT work on women’s hourly 
wage  growth  by  type  of contract.   While  the  penalty  is larger for wo men  with less job  
protection,  that  is, those with fixed-term   contracts,  the penalt y  for women with perm anent 
contracts is far from  negligible.  After  accounting for workers’ observable and unobservable 
characteristics, we find that PT women with permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 log 
points lower hourly wage growth per year than their FT counterparts, and that PT women with 
fixed-term contracts experience 3.9 log points lower hourly wage growth per year then their FT 
counterparts.  These estimates are similar to the ones we would obtain if we were to control for 
employer characteristics.  The reason for this is that the greater loss caused by the occupational 
downgrading and employer turnover that a switch  to PT em ployment may imply seems to be 
cancelled out by workers’ upgrading to better paid  industries (or, alternatively, com ing from 
relatively lower paid industries to start with).   Finally, we have found that while women with 
permanent contracts negatively self-select into PT employment, the opposite occurs for wo men 
with fixed-term contracts.  We believe that the positive self-selection into PT fixed-term jobs is 
due  to the dual nature of the Spanish labor  market  and the marginalization of fixed-term 
contracts. 
 
                                                 
26 Given that Blank (1998) and Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) have found that the past labor market history is 
important in determining the likelihood of working part-time, adding such covariates reduces our bias of 
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Sample size   440,813  440,813 
(# individuals)  74,926  74,926 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level (two-sided test). All models control for all set of covariates.  indicates that the difference 
between the after and before 1999 periods of the estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 
























Our  findings  suggest that PT e mployment  marginalizes  workers  and t hat  this 
marginalization is greater for workers  with fixed-term contracts.  Given t he concentration of 
women in PT jobs (and with fixed-term contracts) in Spain, these results bring to light another 
dimension  of gender discrim ination  in  the Span ish  labor market.  Our results suggest the 
following two (MORE?)  policy implications.  First, in a country with important segmented 
labor markets, such as Spain, part-time workers are the least protected and the most penalized 
(we  are  not  the first   to evidence to wards  consistent  with this finding, see, for instan ce, 
Pissarides et al., 2003; De la Rica and Ferrero, 2003).  Instead of adding flexibility in the labor 
market by promoting a ‘new underclass’, more effort ought to be spent in engaging in a “real” 
reform  of th e  Spanish la bor  market.   Second, wh ile  PT work   seems to b e  an opti on  for 
reconciling work and family for women with permanent contracts, this does not seem to be the 
case for women with fixed-term contracts (as those who switched into PT employment are those 
with stronger work preferences).  Given  the vast reserve of potential labor force that represen t 
inactive  women in Spain,
27  and considering the c hallenges  that the Spanis h  society ha s  in 
reconciling work and family,
28 the current laws allowing for flexible working hours for mothers 
of young children are clearly not suffic ient.  Other policies (such as raising the availability  of 
affordable good-quality childcare) ought to be used  to help women turn to full -time jobs with 
more  prospects.  An alt ernative  solution  may  be to reduce the negative future care er 
consequences of a period spent in part-time work, for example by giving parents greater rights 
to change hours (including to work pa rt-time but also to resume their full-time job—this was 
done in Spain with the Law of 1999.)  Therefore we should see a decrease of the part-time wage 
penalty after the law.  Table 7 illustrat es the effect of the 1999 l aw.  After the law, the PT  
penalty was reduced by  half for both women w ith fixed-term contracts and permanent ones.
29  















                                                 
27 Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) estimate that 38% of females remained inactive in Spain between 1994 and 
1999 (compared to an average of 26% in the EU).   
28 Sanchez-Mangas and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) highlight the following five stylized facts that illustrate 
the  difficulties  Spanish  mothers  have  in recon ciling  employment  and  family.   Fi rst,  the  Spanish 
employment rate for mothers is among the lowest in the OECD (Gutiérrez-Domenech, 2005).  Second, 
Spanish  maternity  leave  is,  on  average,  nine  weeks  shorter  than  in  most  of  the  European  countries 
(OECD, 2001).  Third, the use of formal child-care arrangements for three-year-old children is much less 
frequent in Spain than in the average European country.  For instance, in 2001 the proportion of children 
under the age of three in preschool was only 9 percent in Spain, in sharp contrast with the European 
average of 25 percent.  Fourth, the 2004 Spanish Labor Population Survey indicates that 29 percent of 
women aged 45 and younger reported family responsibilities as their main reason for not participating in 
the labor market.  Last, but not least, having one of the lowest fertility rate among the EU-15 countries is 
also indicative of difficulties of reconciling work and family in Spain (Eurostat, 2007). 
29 EXPLAIN WHY WE CANNOT EXPECT THE EFFECT GREATER FOR ONE GROUP VERSUS 
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